Environmental protection in environmentally reactive firms: lessons from corporate Argentina by Liston-heyes, Catherine & Vazquez Brust, Diego Alfonso
1 
 
Environmental Protection in Environmentally Reactive Firms: 
Lessons from Corporate Argentina 
 
Abstract 
We propose a model of planned corporate environmental behaviour that emphasises the 
values and attitudes of managers towards the environment, environmental intentions and the 
context in which these intentions are formed and translated into actual performance. In 
particular, we focus on the extent to which environmentally reactive (as oppose to pro-
active) managers influence the environmental performance of their firms. We identify the 
factors that mitigate or accentuate the effects of environmental “reactivism” – i.e. a mind-set 
shared by those who assign to the state the responsibility of protecting the environment.  We 
generate a series of hypotheses and use structural equation modelling to test them in the 
context of a unique data-set of Argentinean firms. Our system’s approach to corporate 
environmental behaviour explains approximatively 70% of the variation in reported 
environmental performance across firms while highlighting elements of the model that may 
potentially be influenced by policy. Amongst other things, our empirical results suggest that 
stakeholder pressures can be an effective tool in the development of pro-environmental 
attitudes (and environmental intentions in the case of small firms) and in so doing offset 
some of the negative effects of environmental reactivism on environmental performance. 
Our paper highlights a number of other important implications for the design and 
implementation of environmental policies that account for human managerial determinants 
of corporate behaviour and social factors. 
 
Keywords: Argentina, Environmental Attitude, Environmental Behaviour, Environmental 
Management Systems, Environmental Reactivism, Structural Equation Modelling 
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Environmental Protection in Environmentally Reactive Firms: 
Lessons from Corporate Argentina 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite recent and renewed faith in regulatory approaches to curb environmental 
degradation (Karnani, 2011), evidence suggests that voluntary actions by firms may still be 
needed to compensate for enforcement failures (Darnall, Henriques and Sadorsky, 2009). 
Despite this our understanding of the environmental behaviour of firms and how they can be 
persuaded to engage voluntarily in corporate environmental protection is incomplete and 
lacks coherence (Valente, 2012). 
What is needed is an account of the overall institutional process of corporate 
environmental behaviour, one linking core environmental beliefs and attitudes to actual 
performance. Doing this requires recognition that (a) organisational actors interact with 
internal and external stakeholders and come to share understandings of what to do and why 
(Halme, 2002) and (b) within an organisation, this collective creation of meaning is shaped 
by the core beliefs and attitudes of their members (Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph and 
DePalma, 2006). 
Core beliefs about what is ‘normal’ reflect how the individual perceives power 
relationships in society, including notions of who is empowered and social/ethical frames 
(Foucault, 1984). In this paper, we shall argue that `policy beliefs about agency` – i.e. whose 
responsibility it is to protect the environment – is the most relevant dimension of core beliefs 
in the determination of corporate environmental behaviour (Dryzek, 1997; Simon and 
Sandstrom, 2011). This assumption is embodied in the introduction of `corporate 
environmental reactivism`, a construct that captures the extent to which a firm (i.e. its 
managers) believes that the responsibility to look after the environment lies with the state.   
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Our ultimate objective is to map out the conversion of this core belief (i.e. the extent 
of environmental reactivism) into corporate environmental performance, specifying as best 
as we can the stages in-between. Evidence suggest that core beliefs are difficult to alter so 
understanding these intermediate stages may help identify how, when and where policy can 
be most effective in influencing final outcomes (Sabatier, 1988).   
Our paper consequently develops a multi-stage model of corporate environmental 
behaviour which is empirically tested using data collected from 536 Argentinean firms. The 
concept of corporate environmental behaviour is unpacked into five different core 
dimensions: the company’s core beliefs towards the environment (Environmental 
Reactivism), the company’s managerial locus of control, the company's attitude towards 
environmental activities (Environmental Attitude), activities companies do to protect the 
natural environment (Environmental Management Intentions) and the success of such 
activities (Environmental Performance). To these we add two exogenous context factors – 
internal obstacles and stakeholder pressures.  Structural equation modelling is then used to 
estimate the relative strengths of the relationships between these behavioural components in 
the determination of corporate environmental behaviour and the impact of context variables 
on these relationships. We argue that such insights can help the design and implementation 
of environmental policies that explicitly account for the human element while recognising 
the social context in which they are implemented. 
In this way the paper makes theoretical, empirical and policy contributions. From a 
theoretical perspective, the model emphasizes how insights from individual behaviour 
theories can be used to understand corporate environmental behaviour. In particular it 
underlines the role played by managers’ core policy belief about agency – whose 
responsibility it is to protect the environment - in the determination of environmental 
attitudes, intentions and performance. It also depicts the behavioural mechanisms by which 
4 
 
stakeholder pressures and internal obstacles influence corporate environmental performance. 
Our empirical contribution is achieved by using this multi-stage model to test 6 hypotheses 
that evaluate the importance of the human element in the ‘greening’ of corporate behaviour 
using a unique data set of Argentinean firms. Given the limited number of studies on the 
environmental behaviour of managers in developing countries, our investigation of 
environmental reactivism adds to our understanding of collective forms of social 
responsibility and serves as a useful benchmark for international comparisons. The paper’s 
third objective is to highlight some of the implications of the analyses for the design and 
implementation of environmental policies in the context of environmental reactivism. 
The paper is organised into 8 sections. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 explains how the model is operationalized and presents the hypotheses. Sections 4, 
5 and 6 follow with a description of the data and analyses. Section 7 draws out results. 
Conclusions and policy implications follow in Section 8. 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR 
Etzioni (2007) is amongst those who argue that the existing literature on firms and the 
natural environment is not particularly cohesive. In particular, our understanding of why 
companies respond differently to the same pressures is very fragmented (Boiral, 2007; Kock, 
Santalo and Diestre, 2012). 
 Existing studies predominantly focus on the analysis of external pressures (e.g. 
regulatory stringency) on an organisation (Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Delgado-Ceballos, 
Aragon-Correa, Ortiz de Mandojan, and Rueda-Manzanares, 2012; Bansal and Gao, 2009) 
and less on the interactions of individuals and organisational factors in forming a corporate 
response to green issues. Cordano, Marshall and Silverman (2010) is a notable exception. 
Using the U.S. wine industry as their platform and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991) as their theoretical framework, the authors examine managers’ attitudes, norms and 
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perceptions of stakeholder pressures to assess their intention to implement environmental 
management systems (EMS). They subsequently test whether voluntarily established EMS 
increased the success of firms’ energy conservation and recycling practices. Their study 
highlights the importance of employee norms in the adoption of EMSs while making 
recommendations about EMS components that are particularly effective in the U.S. wine 
industry. 
Our model builds on Cordano et al (2010) and extends it in several important ways. 
Firstly, we formulate a model of corporate environmental behaviour where organisational 
constraints and institutional pressures indirectly determine environmental outcomes through 
their impact on the implementation of EMS. Secondly, we use structural equation modelling 
to investigate the mediating role of EMS in converting ‘green’ attitudes into improved 
environmental performance. Thirdly, our model uses an objective construct of environmental 
performance that covers a wider range of environmental impacts. Finally, our sample 
includes a variety of potentially polluting industries in the province of Buenos Aires 
(Argentina) where norms, attitudes, stakeholder pressures and markets are likely to be 
substantially different than those found in the US wine industry. 
As in Cordano et al (2010), we use Azjen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) as a theoretical foundation and assume that pro-environmental outcomes are preceded 
by implementation intentions. We also adopt their suggestion that implementation intentions 
can be proxied by the strength of their environmental management systems (EMS). Ajzen, 
Czasch and Flood (2009) empirically demonstrates that correlations between stated attitudes 
and behaviour are often lower than theoretical expectations but that this gap can be reduced 
by using “implementation intentions” – i.e. actual plans, procedures and systems (such as 
EMS) specifying when, where and how the intended behaviour (i.e. full compliance with 
legislation) will be carried out and facilitating its implementation. For this reasons we shall 
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refer to EMS as environmental management intentions or (EMIs) throughout the remainder 
of the paper. Our model assumes that EMIs are influenced by managers’ feelings of 
empowerment and beliefs about agency (Hines, Hungerford and Tomera, 1987; Bamberg 
and Moser, 2007). 
We also recognise that the translation of ‘intentions to behave’ into ‘actual 
behaviour’ will be influenced by obstacles and pressures (Ostrom, 1999; Stern, Dietz and 
Guagnano, 1995). External pressures can “…(E)nhance managers’ ability to voice their 
views allowing change to spread from pockets wider into the organisation.” (Halme, 
2002:10) It is also recognized that external pressures can trigger improvements in 
environmental performance, even if the dominant values remain non-environmental 
(Newton, 2002). More concretely, firms can ‘cope’ with pro-environmental external 
pressures by deploying ‘symbolic performance’ without implementing significant 
performance improvement (Boiral, 2010). Nonetheless, continued pressures and managers` 
perceptions of the importance of such pressures can help overcome organisational resistance 
and translate symbolic actions into actual performance (Etzioni, 2007; Henriques, Husted 
and Montiel, 2013) since managers are likely to try and form long-term coalitions with 
external stakeholders who they perceive as being influential (Simon and Sandstrom, 2011).   
Although significantly less attention has been given in the literature to the obstacles 
which negatively affect corporate environmental performance (Delgado-Ceballos et al, 2012) 
previous research emphasises organisational constraints such as the lack of resources, skills 
and training of employees in matters relating to the environment (Dasgupta, Hettige and 
Wheeler, 2000; Banerjee, 2001; Vazquez, Liston-Heyes, Plaza-Ubeda and Burgos-Jimenez, 
2010).  Obstacles and pressures are included in our corporate TPB model as context factors 
that impact upon the translation of beliefs into actions.  
OPERATIONALISING THE MODEL 
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This section describes the components of the theoretical model and the hypotheses tested in 
the analyses section. A structural representation of the theoretical framework and the 
proposed hypotheses are depicted in Figure 1 below.  
Environmental Reactivism 
Following Sabatier’s (1987) and Dryzek’s (1997) analysis of environmental 
discourses we argue that a core policy belief that is key in explaining attitudes towards 
environmental protection relates to notions of agency in environmental protection. For this 
reason, we focus on the extent to which firms adhere to ‘corporate environmental reactivism’ 
to represent their core organisational policy belief in matters of environmental protection. 
More concretely, environmental reactivism is a cognitive representation of bounded 
responsibility towards environmental protection according to which firms’ only 
responsibility is to abide by the law. Under extreme forms of environmental reactivism, the 
state is recognised as the only actor empowered to devise coordinated strategies for 
translating environmental protection objectives into regulation - individual and 
organisational voluntary actions are not needed. 
By placing the core policy belief of environmental reactivism at the heart of our 
model, we recognise that “(…) a firm’s values impede, shape and filter the change efforts 
that individual initiate” (Bansal, 2003: 519). 
Managerial Locus of Control 
Even if environmental beliefs are deeply ingrained in the manager’s psyche, their 
translation into attitudes, intentions and behaviour will be determined by his or her locus of 
control – i.e. what the individual sees as being within or beyond his/her control given context 
specific constraints (Stern et al, 1995; Bamberg and Moser, 2007). There is a difference in 
strategy-making behaviour between managers who exhibit an internal locus of control - they 
think that their own behaviour ‘makes’ a difference - versus that of managers with an 
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external locus of control who see change as somewhat random and/or provoked by more 
influential people (Hines et al, 1987). The former tend to promote innovative, pro-active and 
riskier corporate strategies while the latter will tend to follow strategies within the 
constraints of rigid external boundaries “that cannot be violated” (Miller, Kets de Vries and 
Toulouse, 1982:251).  
Environmental Performance Attitudes 
Attitudes are judgements about the importance of a particular issue and about the 
selection of a behaviour that fits with a given situation. Beliefs are converted into attitudes 
before they are translated into intentions and actual behaviours (Martin and Simint iras, 
1995).  Research examining the factors related to green behaviour suggests that an 
individual’s ecological attitude is highly dependent upon his/her knowledge of the relevant 
environmental issues (Bamberg and Moser, 2007). This study focusses on attitudes towards 
environmental practices relating to ‘action-based knowledge’ at the corporate level. Unlike 
general knowledge which relates to managers’ rudimentary understanding of environmental 
issues including basic terminology and concepts, action-based knowledge relates to 
managers’ understanding of the activities required to mitigate environmental problems. It 
includes an awareness of the consequences of individuals’ actions on the environment and of 
the remedies that can improve behaviour (Hines et al., 1987). Individuals with stronger 
action-based knowledge about a particular set of practices are more likely to have a positive 
attitude towards the importance of these practices to environmental protection (Bamberg and 
Moser. 2007)  
Environmental Management Intentions (EMIs) and Environmental Performance 
Attitudes influence specific intentions to implement (or not) a behaviour (Cordano et 
al, 2004). Despite conventional wisdom, correlations between stated/reported intentions and 
actual behaviour are not as strong as theory suggests in the context of self-regulation 
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(Bamberg and Moser, 2007). However, these become much stronger if we consider the link 
between implemented intentions - i.e. intentions that are materialised into specific plans and 
strategies to carry a specific behaviour (Ajzen et al, 2009).  
Ajzen et al’s (2009) implementation intentions construct includes factors that are 
actual actions such as ‘developing a detailed plan’, ‘designing strategies’ and ‘setting 
mechanisms and systems to support the intended behaviour’. Implementation intentions are 
assumed to reflect responsiveness. They produce commitment but also “automaticity in 
behavior by means of a single mental pairing of a goal-directed behavior with critical 
stimulus cues” (Ajzen et al, 2009:181). In our model, corporate environmental management 
intentions (EMIs) are measured by the extent and degree of formalization of internal 
administrative systems to encourage and support improvements in environmental 
performance. Consequently, our conceptualization of EMIs refer to all firm activities that 
enable it to detect and react to green pressures including administrative support, planning, 
coordination, training and management efforts to identify and implement practices to 
improve environmental performance as well as the communication of such efforts to 
stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Cordano et al, 2004) - i.e. EMIs are inclusive 
of formal EMSs.  
 We follow Klassen and McLaughin (1996) and Cordano et al (2010) in not assuming 
that EMIs can be used to proxy environmental performance. Instead, the environmental 
performance of the firm is measured by a multidimensional measure of the success of its 
environmental actions (Klassen and McLaughin, 1996; Henriques et al, 2013). Thus, the 
‘environmental performance’ construct includes the success of both reactive (legislation, 
compliance, treatment plants) and proactive (R&D, green products, waste minimization, 
recycling/reusing, remanufacturing, energy reduction, continuous improvement) actions 
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identified in the technical environmental literature as conducive to direct reductions in 
environmental externalities.  
Context Factors: Internal Obstacles and Stakeholder Pressures  
Following Ostrom (1999), the model recognises that the translation of beliefs into 
intentions to behave will be influenced by obstacles and drivers of environmental 
performance. Pressures to be ‘green’ have been the subject of a plethora of studies including 
those by Delmas and Toffel (2008) and Sharma and Henriques (2005). Managers tend to 
categorise such pressures into opportunities to achieve gains, threats and/or requirements. 
Our model recognises this by adding a number of institutional, organisational and market 
motivators to our list of context factors including opportunities to improve competitiveness 
(Sharma and Henriques, 2005), social legitimacy (Kennedy and Fiss, 2010), mimicry 
(Bansal, 2005), threats from formal (Angell and Rands, 2003) and informal regulation 
(Dasgupta et al, 2000), supply chain requirements (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996), and 
internal organisational stakeholder requirements (Balogun and Johnson, 2005). 
Significantly less attention has been given to the obstacles or inhibitors that 
negatively affect the development of a proactive environmental strategy (Delgado-Ceballos 
et al, 2012). Internal obstacles to environmental efforts typically span three categories: i) 
lack of environmental training and skills (Dasgupta et al, 2000; Banerjee, 2001); ii) lack of 
economic resources and iii) low priority assigned to environmental issues (Vazquez et al, 
2010).1 In this study, the choice of obstacles is inspired by work conducted by Dasgupta et al 
(2000) in Mexico on behalf of the World Bank. 
The items used to measure these seven concepts are discussed further below. 
Hypotheses 
 From the previous discussion, we derive six testable hypotheses and sub-hypotheses 
that underpin the statistical analyses that follow. 
11 
 
A high value attached to the environmental reactivism scale reflects managers’ 
beliefs that the scope of their firms' environmental responsibility is defined by the regulator. 
In other words, a high score means that managers are aware of environmental challenges but 
they give environmental issues priority only if required to so do by regulators. If 
enforcement is low they will comply with environmental regulation only if it does not clash 
with shareholder’s interests. A lower score is associated with firms that are more pro-active 
and willing to act independently beyond regulatory strictures. 
High levels of environmental reactivism are typical of ‘defensive firms’ in the phase 
of adjustment to environmental pressures. Managers with this type of mind-set will avoid 
acknowledgment of responsibility at corporate level believing that companies are powerless 
to improve the environment on their own (Dryzek, 1997). For this reason, we postulate that 
their locus of control will be perceived as ‘external’ to the organisation. An external locus of 
control in the environmental context implies a reluctance to accept that individuals play a 
role in causing environmental deterioration and should be involved in actions to mitigate it 
(Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh, 2007). We also hypothesise that managers, 
while acknowledging environmental challenges, will downplay their urgency and centrality 
and assign higher priorities to economic and developmental concerns (Dryzek, 1997). A 
strongly reactivist environmental mindset will also limit investments in environmental 
action-based knowledge acquisition and lead to unambitious goal setting with respect to the 
environment – i.e. a relatively weak environmental attitude (Crane, 2000). Although 
regulatory compliance will be considered important, voluntary actions will be assigned low 
organisational priority and their implementation will be strongly influenced by financial 
considerations (Kock et al, 2012). In other words, we expect that the extent of environmental 
reactivism at the firm will be positively related to an external corporate managerial locus of 
control and inversely related to the environmental attitude construct.  
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H1a: Corporate environmental reactivism will be positively related to an external 
managerial locus of control.   
H1b: Corporate environmental reactivism will be negatively related to a strong corporate 
environmental attitude. 
The managerial locus of control determines the extent to which managers of a firm 
feel empowered to make a difference to the environment. Leadership research suggests that 
internally-oriented managers are more confident in their ability to impact the environment, 
more skilled in dealing with stressful situations, place more emphasis on open and 
supportive means of influence, engage in riskier and more innovative company strategies 
and generate higher group and company performance than do managers with externally-
oriented managerial loci of control (Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulose, 1982; Waldman, 
Siegel and Javidan, 2006). 
 Research on organisations and the natural environment suggests that an internal locus 
of control is a strong determinant of environmental strategy and intended pro-environmental 
behaviour (Williams and Schaefer, 2013). Individuals who have an internal environmental 
locus of control (stronger sense of empowerment towards environmental concerns) are more 
likely to act in a way that mitigates these concerns and are less afraid of taking risks for the 
‘right’ reasons (Hines et al, 1987; Stern et al, 1995; Bamberg and Moser, 2007). Thus, firms 
led by managers with an internal locus of control tend to be relatively more environmentally 
responsive (Vazquez-Brust and Liston-Heyes, 2010). In contrast, firms with an external 
locus of control will use neutralization strategies – e.g. “my firm is too small to make an 
impact”, “my firm will not be competitive” – to justify inadequate action (Hillary, 2000). We 
repeat and extend these predictions by assuming that a more internally focussed locus of 
control plays an important part in developing environmental management intentions and 
mobilising firms into action. 
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H2a: More internally-focussed locus of control will be positively related to stronger 
environmental attitudes.  
H2b: More internally-focussed locus of control will be positively related to stronger 
environmental management intentions.  
For similar reasons, the attitude of managers towards what is socially acceptable in 
terms of the corporate-environment relationship will frame discussions of organisational 
change and ‘normal’ practices (Balogun and Johnson, 2005). This will impact upon how 
firms set their performance goals and hence on actual environmental behaviour (Bamberg 
and Moser, 2007; Balogun and Johnson, 2005). Attitudes underpinned by action-based 
knowledge affect motivation, strategy and ability to act in an environmentally friendly way. 
The more knowledge, the stronger the commitment to implement the behaviour will be 
(Bamberg and Moser, 2007). 
Insights from behavioural theories also suggest that environmental intentions mediate 
the relationship between environmental attitude and environmental performance particularly 
when performance is self-regulated (Ajzen et al, 2009; Bamberg and Moser, 2007). 
Corporate practices signalling ‘environmental intentions’ such as environmental 
managements systems, training or implementation strategies facilitate the translation of 
action-based knowledge and attitudes into outcomes and bring about environmental 
performance (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009).  
 Accordingly, we postulate that a strong environmental attitude will impact directly on 
EMIs (H3a) and environmental performance (H3b) (Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995). We also 
hypothesise that EMIs mediate the relationship between action-based knowledge and 
environmental performance (H3c).  
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H3a: The strength of the environmental attitude will be positively related to environmental 
management intentions (EMIs).  
H3b: The strength of the environmental attitude will be positively related to corporate 
environmental performance. 
H3c: Environmental management intentions mediate the relationship between the strength of 
environmental attitude and corporate environmental performance. 
 Developing ‘implementation intentions’ - plans, procedures and systems - creates 
commitments to perform a given behaviour (Ajzen et al, 2009). At the firm, EMIs inform 
managers about its liabilities, provide guidance on how to achieve a good performance and 
institutionalise environmental performance as a corporate objective (Potosky and Pradash, 
2005). They also act as a facilitator in the implementation of pro-environmental practices by 
helping to resolve internal agency control issues which can result in adverse environmental 
impacts. Surprisingly however, the empirical evidence on EMIs efficiency is mixed (Anton, 
Deltas and Khanna, 2003; Henriques et al, 2013). Some authors found that the adoption of 
environmental management systems (our proxy for EMIs) lead to significant improvements 
in environmental performance (e.g. Dasgupta et al, 2000; Potosky and Pradash, 2005) while 
others found no such evidence (King and Lennox, 2000; Boiral, 2007). 
Boiral (2007) argues that in many cases environmental management systems do not 
improve performance because they are only aimed to be symbolic actions for external 
stakeholders. Managers are aware that failing to signal pro-environmental responsiveness 
can result in a loss of social legitimacy (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009). To overcome 
conflicts in the allocations of resources while minimising damage to social legitimacy, 
managers will favour symbolic actions (e.g. codes of conduct) without necessarily applying 
them in practice (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). Symbolic actions are less costly than actual 
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behaviour but are effective in managing public perceptions of legitimacy and social 
acceptance. 
Anton, Deltas and Khanna (2003) suggest that it is the comprehensiveness of the 
EMS (depth and range of issues addressed) that explains differences in performance. In their 
study, firms with more comprehensive EMS have lower toxic emissions per unit output. 
Likewise, Johnstone and Labonne (2009) found that certified EMS are in general more 
comprehensive than non-certified ones and that firms with more comprehensive EMS are 
more likely to have a variety of other environmental management tools in place (see also 
Henriques et al, 2013). 
In line with these findings, the EMIs index used here assigns higher scores to firms 
with more formalised and comprehensive environmental management systems. We 
hypothesise that firms with a higher EMI index will show improved environmental 
performance (H4).  
H4: Stronger environmental management intentions are positively related to corporate 
environmental performance. 
Change is incremental in most organisations. Environmentally reactive managers 
often begin the process of responding to “greening” pressures by modifying current practices 
‘as needed’ (Post and Altman, 1994). Path dependency and organisational inertia create 
biases against environmental goal setting, the development of EMIs and the carrying out 
concrete environmental actions when organisations have to make decisions about the 
distribution of scarce resources (Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 2009). Without strong 
environmental values in the organisation, middle managers will tend to be averse to 
environmental improvements and unable to surmount corporate inertia and other internal 
obstacles (Kock et al, 2012). Following Post and Altman (1994), we hypothesise that 
internal obstacles will weaken environmental attitudes, EMIs and corporate environmental 
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performance thereby creating the performance gaps frequently observed in the execution of 
environmental change programmes. 
H5a: Internal obstacles are negatively related to the environmental attitude construct.  
H5b: Internal obstacles are negatively related to environmental management intentions.   
H5c: Internal obstacles are negatively related to corporate environmental performance.  
Organisational change in firms with environmentally reactive CEOs will tend to 
follow a mostly reactive and incremental pattern, driven by regulatory and market pressures 
(Post and Altman, 1994). These firms are typically able to identify pro-environmental 
pressures that need to be addressed to ensure the organisation’s survival (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008). In this way stakeholder pressures are effective in mobilising environmentally reactive 
firms into actions. 
Neo-institutional theorists argue that organisational structures and processes 
seemingly implemented for compliance purposes are often created only to buffer the 
organisation from stakeholder pressures (Etzioni, 2007). As discussed, responses to 
pressures may be decoupled from the actual environmental impacts of the firm if they 
respond with mostly ‘symbolic actions’ (green-washing). Nonetheless, over-reliance on 
symbolic actions has limited long term appeal as stakeholders learn to decipher real from 
stated actions (Johnston and Labonne, 2009). Moreover, competitive pressures add impetus 
to behaviour change (Bansal, 2005).  
We therefore postulate that increases in environmental pressures will be matched by 
stronger environmental attitudes (H6a), enhanced intended behaviour (H6b) and improved 
corporate environmental performance (H6c).  
H6a: Stakeholder pressures are positively related to the environmental attitude construct.  
H6b: Stakeholder pressures are positively related to environmental management intentions.   
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H6c: Stakeholder pressures are positively related to corporate environmental performance.  
 
We control for the effects of firm size on these relationships (H1-H6). Firm size is a 
common control variable in empirical studies as it captures competitive benefits associated 
with average costs and greater bargaining power. The traditional argument for including size 
in studies of environmental regulation is that there are likely to be economies of scale in both 
the productive and administrative aspects of compliance with environmental requirements 
(Heyes, 2009). In other words, bigger firms may find compliance and environmental 
performance ‘cheaper’ than smaller firms and be relatively more pro-active in terms of 
staying ahead of the enforcement game. Big firms also tend to be the prime target of militant 
stakeholders and green activists and are hence more likely to be scrutinised than their smaller 
counterparts (Baron, 2001). Our model and these hypotheses are summarised in Figure 1. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
DATA    
The first phase of the project entailed an exploratory study of 50 Argentinean firms 
using corporate reports, audits and semi-structured interviews with environmental actors. 
Discourse analysis was used to uncover key ‘story-lines’ (short narratives) and in the 
identification of dominant corporate paradigms (Vazquez and Liston-Heyes, 2008). Phase I 
was instrumental in the development of the theoretical framework, the ‘environmental 
reactivism’ construct and in operationalizing the data collection.  
Phase II, the subject of this article, focuses on testing the theoretical model. For this 
purpose we designed a large scale survey following the methodological guidelines used by 
previous research in organisational narratives (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004; 
Bartunek et al, 2006) and environmental paradigms (Cotgrove, 1982). Together, these 
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authors argue that discourse analysis provides a useful theoretical framework for exploring 
the social construction of institutions. In particular, they propose a set of conditions and 
features of discourse that lead to the production of institutional processes. Their pioneer 
work encourages the empirical examination of language and storylines in organisational 
research. We used these insights in the conceptualisation and design of the survey 
instruments and in the collection of the data. The time line of this research is represented in 
Figure 2. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
The survey was used to gather information on the relationship between 
environmental beliefs and environmental behaviour by incorporating popular environmental 
‘storylines’ generated by desk-research and discourse analysis (Phase I). It also identified the 
characteristics of the ‘context’ in which the firm and its managers operate. The survey’s third 
objective was to compare the environmental beliefs and attitudes of the individual managers 
in charge of environmental affairs with those displayed by the firm in its corporate reports 
and other public documents.  
DATA   
The Phase II survey was executed in Buenos Aires between March 2006 and March 2007. 
The sample included 536 firms - 13% of the population of polluting industries in the 
provincial industry census - which operate in sectors that use processes that may involve the 
discharge of polluting substances and wastes in water, air or soil, and/or use a lot of energy, 
water and non-renewable resources. These include metallurgy, food and drinks, chemicals 
and petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, non-basic metals, manufacturing, hospitals, treatment 
plants and petrol stations. 
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The sample was selected using a stratified design technique with industry, size, and 
geographical location as selection parameters.2 Approximately 60% of the firms had less 
than 100 employees (the number of employees ranged between 1 and 4190 with an average 
of 97 per firm). The Ministry of Public Works and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) in Argentina supported the delivery and administration of the survey. Linkages to 
these two institutions facilitated access and enhanced participation from managers. The 
municipalities provided access to restricted databases as well as fees and stipends for the 
surveyors operating in their jurisdictions. Focus groups, pilot testing and training sessions 
with surveyors were held to explain and fine-tune the survey instrument. Monitoring of 
selected interviews was organised and a general debriefing/workshop took place to assess the 
quality of the responses once the first 30 questionnaires were completed. 
The survey is composed of two structured questionnaires and a financial annexe. The 
first questionnaire (“Environmental Practices”- 60 minutes) was delivered and completed by 
the manager in charge of environmental affairs within each organisation. The second 
(“Managers’ opinions” - 20 minutes) is shorter and completed by senior managers 
empowered to take strategic decisions on environmental issues at company level. The final 
response rate was 76%.  
Since many of the 98 survey items use a Likert scale (i.e. respondents were asked to 
indicate their agreement with each of a series of statements by indicating a response on a 
scale from 1 to 5) the actual number of questions is well over 300. These can be grouped into 
9 broad categories: i) about the firm, ii) corporate perceptions of existing and planned 
environmental regulations, iii) corporate self-assessment of environmental performance, iv) 
perceived constraints on environmental performance, v) corporate environmental practices 
and behaviour, vi) corporate reasons for compliance and environmental pressures; vii) the 
firm’s human component; viii) respondent’s profile and ix) a financial annexe. More details 
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of these categories are presented in Vazquez (2007). An original Spanish or English 
translation of the questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.   
ANALYSIS 
Structural equation modelling (AMOS 20) is used to test empirically the hypotheses and 
theoretical model presented above. 
We use a strictly confirmatory approach whereby the model is tested using goodness-
of-fit tests to determine if the pattern of variances and covariances in the data is consistent 
with a structural model specified by the researcher (Figure 1). The reader should bear this is 
mind when interpreting the results that there may be other unexamined models consistent the 
data, such that an accepted model is only a ‘not-disconfirmed’ model.   
In accordance with general tradition, latent variables are depicted as ellipses and 
manifest variables as rectangles. Figure 1 represents the hypothesized causal structure as a 
path diagram with variables shown as ellipses and rectangles and possible causal links 
shown as arrows. The parameter estimates were calculated using the maximum likelihood 
method. Missing data was handled using list-wise deletion (the default in AMOS) thereby 
reducing the sample size from n=535 to n=505 (i.e. a reduction of usable data points of 
5.6%). A comparison of the discarded data with overall averages does not indicate 
significant differences in the pattern of responses. 
We first tested a measurement model (Model 1) that includes one observable 
variable, 6 latent variables and 54 items. The latent variables include ENVREACT 
(environmental reactivism – 5 items), LOC (managerial locus of control - 4 items), 
ENVATT (environmental attitude - 9 items), OBS (internal obstacles - 13 items), PRESS 
(stakeholder pressures – 12 items) and ENVPERF (corporate environmental performance – 
11 items). All the latent variables have factor loadings higher than the .40 level and above, a 
rule of thumb routinely used in the social sciences (Ford, MacCallum and Tait, 1986) and 
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display Cronbach Alphas (a popular measure of scale reliability) above .70. The observed 
variable “environmental management intentions” (or EMI) is a weighted average of 11 
dichotomous indicators of the extensiveness of the firm’s environmental management system 
(Chudnovsky, Pupato and Gutman, 2005). EMI scores indicate the completeness and level of 
formalisation of the firm’s environmental management system.  
Prior to testing our structural equation model (SEM), we created parcels for the latent 
variables that had over 5 items. Parcels in SEM help to maintain a manageable indicator-to-
sample size ratio (e.g. Bagozzi and Edwards, 1998; Bagozzi and Heatherton, 1994), provide 
an adequate representation of latent constructs (Hagtvet and Nasser, 2004), have higher 
reliabilities than single items and offer a better approximation of normal distribution on 
continuous variables (Kishton and Widaman, 1994). Accordingly in Model 2 we create 
parcels using the ‘item-to-construct balance’ approach described in Little, Cunningham, 
Shahar and Widaman (2002).3  More concretely, we created 3 parcels across 9 items to 
measure environmental attitudes (ENVATT), 3 parcels across 13 items to measure internal 
obstacles (OBS), 3 parcels across 12 items to measure stakeholder pressures (PRESS) and 3 
parcels across 11 items to measure environmental performance (ENVPERF). We left the 
ENVREACT and LOC constructs untouched since they have fewer items.  
In Model 3, we preserve the same structure but parcel the items associated with 
PRESS and ENVPERF differently. The exploratory factor analyses suggest that these two 
variables have relatively weaker unidimensional structures than the other latent variables. 
Consequently, we test a model where the parcels for these two variables reflect these 
secondary influences – i.e. parcels are internally consistent facets that are used as manifest 
indicators of the higher order construct (Little et al, 2002:167; see also Kishton and 
Widaman, 1994). Tables I-VII describe the items in each construct. The mean and standard 
deviation are shown for each item along with factor loadings and parcel membership in 
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Models 2 and 3. The studies underpinning the constructs (see also Section 3) are listed in the 
last row of each table. Table VIII provides construct reliability coefficients and correlations 
between the variables of the model.  
While the measurement model (Model 1) performed satisfactorily in the confirmatory 
factor analysis, its overall fit is substantially improved by the introduction of parcelling. 
(Goodness-of-fit indicators with recommended thresholds appear in the first 4 columns of 
Table IX.) Since Models 2 and 3 performed well, we used both in our analyses of the 
structural model presented in Figure 1 – i.e. Structural Model 2 uses an item-to-construct 
balance approach to parcelling while Structural Model 3a uses higher order constructs for 
PRESS and ENVPERF.  
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 





Goodness-of-fit indicators for Structural Models 2 and 3a appear in Table IX and are 
all within the satisfactory range. This is reassuring given that the choice of parcelling 
technique can impact the performance of SEM if unmodeled secondary factors are present 
(Hall, Snell and Foust, 1999). A detailed examination of the outputs does not indicate major 
differences in the sign and/or statistical significance of the parameter estimates between 
Models 2 and 3a. For readability purposes, we only present estimates of Model 3a (which 
keeps the multidimensional nature of the PRESS and ENVPERF constructs explicit) in 
Figure 1 and Table IX since it performed marginally better than Model 2.4  
As for the effects of firm size, we control for them in two ways. First, we introduce 
‘SIZE’ as an exogenous control variable in the structural model and test its impact on the 
endogenous variables. Secondly, we separate the data into two sets - small firms (i.e. firms 
with less than 100 employees) and large firms (i.e. firms with 100 employees or more) – and 
test these models for configural invariance to verify that they share the same structure and to 
identify differences in regression estimates. While Model 3b (small firms) performed well 
statistically, some of the goodness-of-fit indicators for Model 3c (large firms) are somewhat 
weaker (i.e. the Hoelter Indices are below the 200 threshold and the RMSEA is within the 
acceptable as oppose to the “very good” range). Overall however the model’s fit indicators 
are within satisfactory limits lending credence to its estimates.   
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
The final structural models 3a, 3b and 3c explained 68%, 61% and 86% of the 
variance in the Environmental Performance variable. Table X presents standardised 
regression coefficients, standard errors and probability levels. The last column indicates 
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whether there are qualitative differences between the coefficients of small versus large firms. 
Figure 3 presents the final structural model (Model 3a) with statistically significant 
standardised path estimates.  
DISCUSSION 
All but two of hypotheses (H5a and H6c in Figure 1) are supported by the analyses 
although H1b only holds for large firms and H6b only holds for small firms. We shall 
discuss the results using all the firms in the first instance and add specific comments on the 
effects of size when relevant.  
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE X ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Consistent with H1a, the extent of environmental reactivism of senior managers is a 
significant and positive predictor of an external managerial locus of control (all=0.40; 
small=0.44; large=0.45; p<.01) for firms of all sizes. Environmental reactivism is also linked 
to weaker environmental attitudes (H1b) although this was only true for larger firms (large=-
0.17; p<.01). In other words, “reactive” managers tend to feel powerless in solving wider 
environmental problems, a role they delegate to the state. These results suggest that 
environmental reactivism weakens environmental attitudes in significant ways for large 
firms and is strongly associated with a more externally focused managerial locus of control 
in all firms.  
We also test the hypotheses that a more internally focussed managerial locus of 
control leads to stronger environmental attitudes (H2a) and management intentions (H2b). 
These two hypotheses are supported by the data and hold for all firms (H2a: all=-.21; 
small=-.23; large=-0.17 and H2b: all=-.18; small=-.22; large=-0.18; all with p<.01). We can 
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conclude tentatively that an external managerial locus of control – i.e. when the firm feels 
powerless to prevent environmental degradation – is linked to weaker environmental goals 
and environmental intentions.  Taken together, environmental reactivism appears to have 
profound negative effects on corporate environmental attitudes and environmental 
management intentions.   
Next we investigate the relationships between environmental attitudes and 
management intentions (H3a) as well as corporate environmental performance (H3b). As 
postulated, the setting of higher environmental goals leads to more ambitious environmental 
intentions (all=0.32; small=0.38; large=0.44; p<.01) – while this is true for all firms, it is 
worth noting that the coefficient for large firms is significantly greater. Stronger 
environmental attitudes also appear to be conducive to an enhanced overall environmental 
performance by firms (all=0.54; small=0.59; large=0.60; p<.01). In turn, H4 tests the extent 
to which environmental management intentions are a strong predictor of environmental 
performance. As expected, the coefficient is relatively high, positive and statistically 
significant for all size firms (all=0.60; small=0.57; large=0.57; p<.01). In effect, having a 
stronger environmental attitude has a direct effect on environmental performance and an 
indirect effect through an intensification of environmental intentions (H3c). In other words, 
EMIs mediate the environmental attitude – corporate environmental performance 
relationship as hypothesised. The introduction of EMIs partially mediates this link and 
enhances the level of explained variance in the ENVPERF variable from .47 to .68. Without 
EMIs the parameter estimates between ENVATT and ENVPERF is all=0.60, p<.01. It is 
interesting to note that environmental attitudes remain very important in the determination of 
environmental performance even when environmental management intentions are accounted 




 Next are the hypotheses pertaining to the context variables that are external to the 
model (i.e. they are not endogenously determined). The first construct - internal obstacles - 
captures resource scarcities that can potentially impede the firm in the setting of strong pro-
environmental attitudes (H5a), in the development of management intentions (H5b) and in 
the realisation of a strong corporate environmental performance (H5c). We found the 
coefficients on the two last variables to be negative and statistically significant (H5b: all=-
.16; small=-.09; large=-0.20; H5c: all=-.19; small=-.21; large=-0.17; all with p<.01) as 
hypothesised. However, for small firms there is a positive relationship between internal 
obstacles and the environmental attitude construct – i.e. the higher the perceptions of internal 
obstacles, the stronger the environmental attitude (small=0.15, p<.01) which is somewhat 
puzzling. One plausible explanation for this finding is that rhetoric and goal setting is used to 
overcome strong organisational barriers. Managers often use discursive and other symbolic 
materials to overcome resistance by destroying existing meaning systems and establishing 
new ones in an attempt to give strategic direction (Sonensheim, 2010). Individuals must be 
convinced through ‘organisational rhetoric’ that changes in practices are required to survive 
and thrive. Drawing on Magee and Galinsky’s (2008) conceptualization of status and power, 
we could argue that organisations wanting to overcome internal barriers need an 
environmental attitude and a discourse that emphasises the importance of environmental 
practices to the success of the organisation. In other words, high internal obstacles require 
ambitious environmental attitudes.  
A second explanation draws on our earlier discussion of symbolic performance and 
discourse coalitions. As organisational obstacles increase, managers will try to satisfy 
pressures from external stakeholders with rhetoric and attitudes supporting green-storylines 
(Hajer, 1995). In simpler terms, the higher the perceptions of internal obstacles, the more 
managers invest in (less expensive) symbolic and discursive legitimating strategies such as 
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public relations and the communications of strong environmental attitude and goals  (H5a) at 
the expense of investment in more cost-intensive management systems (H5b) and actual 
behaviour (H5c) (Boiral, 2007). Since internal obstacles reduce environmental intentions, it 
is not clear what overall effects they exert on environmental performance for small firms. 
They are unambiguously damaging for larger firms.  
The construct measuring pressures effectively refers to stakeholder claims made to 
the firm in relation to the environment. These can come in the form of regulation, consumer 
demand for green products, supply chain requirements, community pressures and/or internal 
stakeholder requirements. As hypothesised, stakeholder pressures play an important and 
significant role in the setting of stronger environmental attitudes (H6a: all=.44; small=.43; 
large=.48; p<.01). In smaller firms, pressures also encourage the implementation of more 
sophisticated environmental management systems (H6b; small=0.15; p<.01) although this 
doesn’t seem to be the case for larger firms. Pressures do not appear to be strong direct 
predictors of corporate environmental performance and we need to reject H6c. More 
concretely, stakeholder pressures impact positively on environmental performance but only 
in an indirect fashion through the enhancement of environmental attitudes (as well as 
stronger environmental intentions in the case of smaller firms).  
Taken together the estimates relating to context variables confirm that internal 
obstacles reduce environmental performance directly and indirectly through its impact on 
intentions. Pressures on the other hand only operate indirectly as they are channelled through 
environmental attitudes (all firms) and intentions (for small firms only). Unlike obstacles, 
they do not have a direct effect on how intentions are translated into actual environmental 
performance.  
As explained, we also tested for the effects of firm size on endogenous variables by 
adding a control variable. Firm size does not impact significantly on environmental attitudes 
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or on overall environmental performance. However, the estimates suggest that larger firms 
have more extensive environmental management intentions (=0.14; p<.01) and a more 
internally-focussed managerial locus of control (=-.16; p<.01).  Other things equal, larger 
firms will have more extensive environmental management systems and feel more 
empowered in terms of their ability to act upon the environment. These results are not 
surprising if we recognise that compliance is typically cheaper for bigger firms (Heyes, 
2009). It may also be the case that managers of large firms perceive themselves as more 
‘empowered’ since their firms will usually be more politically and economically powerful 
than their smaller firms. Note that while size enhances environmental performance indirectly 
through more internally focussed managerial locus of control and stronger EMIs, it doesn’t 
directly impact on how intentions translate into performance. In this way, pressures exert a 
relatively ‘narrower’ influence on the behaviour of large firms.   
Overall then, the model performed as hypothesised except for the anticipated direct 
effects of stakeholder pressures on environmental performance (H6c) and for the positive 
impact of obstacles on the environmental attitudes of small firms (H5a).  
   
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents a theoretical model of corporate environmental behaviour that is 
informed by research on behavioural psychology as well as insights from the literature on 
organisations and the natural environment. This model maps out the processes by which 
environmental reactivism - i.e. the extent to which firms accept state regulation but resist 
calls for voluntary engagement with green initiatives – impact upon managerial 
environmental attitudes and ultimately on corporate environmental performance.  
The paper makes theoretical, empirical and policy contributions. From a theoretical 
perspective, our model emphasizes how insights from individual behaviour theories (i.e. 
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TPB) can be used to understand corporate environmental behaviour. In particular it 
underlines the role of managers’ core policy belief about agency – environmental reactivism 
– in the determination of corporate environmental behaviour. It also uncovers the 
behavioural mechanisms by which stakeholder pressures and internal obstacles influence 
corporate environmental performance. Finally, while most models assume that attitudes only 
indirectly affect performance through their impact on intentions - our model allows attitudes 
to impact directly on intentions and performance. In other words, environmental attitudes are 
given a potentially greater role to play in the determination of corporate environmental 
performance.  
Our empirical contribution is realised by testing this multi-stage model on a unique 
data set of Argentinean firms and finding support for most (but not all) of our hypotheses. 
Without repeating our empirical findings, taken together we can assert that they highlight the 
importance of the human element in the greening of corporate behaviour while documenting 
the beliefs, attitudes and practices of Argentinian managers. Given the paucity of studies on 
the environmental behaviour of managers in developing countries, our investigation of 
environmental reactivism adds to our understanding of collective forms of social 
responsibility and serves as a useful benchmark for international comparisons.  
Our third objective, which we turn to now, is to underline some of the implications of 
our findings for the design and implementation of environmental policies in the context of 
environmental reactivism. According to Karnani (2011) command and control narratives are 
making a comeback, at least with regards to managing the environment. However, while 
stricter regulations may well be effective in mobilising ‘environmentally reactive’ firms, 
they are unlikely to materialise and/or be implemented in settings where governments are 
resources-constrained and/or lack political motivation to do so as is often the case in 
Argentina and other developing countries. Our study effectively shows how such firms, 
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characterised as ‘morally hollow while ethically pragmatic’ by Crane’s (2000), can be 
coerced into taking voluntary actions.  
Overall our results lend empirical credibility to a model that we argue has sound 
theoretical grounding, To begin, they suggest that environmental reactivism is associated 
with an externally focussed managerial locus of control that over-relies on the powers of 
economic growth and regulations to remedy environmental degradation and weak 
environmental attitudes. In turn, an externally oriented locus of control and weak 
environmental attitudes lead to poor investment in environmental management systems 
(intentions) and a weak overall environmental performance. While these may be gloomy 
results, we also demonstrate that environmental attitudes can be positively swayed by 
stakeholder pressures.  Since pro-environmental attitudes act directly and indirectly (through 
environmental intentions in the case of small firms) on corporate performance, stakeholder 
pressures can be an interesting counterweight to environmental reactivism. Consequently, 
programs that help groups of stakeholders channel and communicate their demands more 
effectively can encourage the setting of higher performance goals and facilitate the 
conversion of these goals into more environmentally sustainable behaviours. This is 
welcome news given that beliefs about agency (environmental reactivism) are very difficult 
and time consuming to manipulate (Dryzek, 1997).  
Moreover, regulatory actions need not mandate punitive measures and expensive 
enforcement programmes to be influential. In some contexts the setting of regulatory 
requirements and guidelines can enhance the prioritisation of stakeholder claims and trigger 
better communication and sharing of practices within the firm, fostering more mutual 
technical assistance and improving information flow between customers and suppliers 
leading to significant improvements in performance (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). Non-
punitive regulatory guidelines are generally less costly (both financially and politically) and 
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hence more appealing to governments in developing countries. In other words, Argentina 
may not be ready for a system that relies in a major way on voluntary actions by firms nor 
can it rely on regulatory enforcement of punitive fines. However, it may be receptive to more 
coercive forms of stakeholder pressures that are supported by regulations but rooted in 
small-scale practical reasoning at the local level (Scruton, 2012).   
The paper also documents the empirical importance of internal obstacles - the other 
context variable - in the determination of corporate environmental performance. Here too it 
is easy to think of a number of policies that could target the reduction in the perceptions of 
and/or actual organisational obstacles. While political stability and increased transparency 
may be longer term goals, training and awareness programmes that enhance knowledge and 
management skills in environmental matters can substantially decrease real or perceived 
internal obstacles at relatively low costs (Dasgupta et al. 2000).  
In other words, our results demonstrate the potential influence pressures and internal 
obstacles can have on environmental attitudes and intentions. Since these variables can be 
manipulated in the short to medium term, the improvement of environmental performance 
becomes a feasible project even in the absence of strong regulators and in the presence of 
environmental reactive firms. 
While our results lend empirical credibility to a model that we argue has sound 
theoretical grounding, as with any empirical study there are important caveats. First, like 
many studies investigating corporate behaviour the study relies on variables that are based 
on self-reports by key respondents (senior corporate managers). While these respondents are 
likely to be in the best position to answer questions about their firm’s environmental policies 
and behaviour we cannot rule out errors and biased answers. In particular, the model could 
be extended to include reliable measures of financial performance as controls. Such data is 
difficult to obtain in a developing country like Argentina but it would substantially enrich 
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the model. Secondly the empirical study presented has been conducted in one cultural setting 
(Argentina) and a limited set of industry contexts (polluting sectors). This might limit the 
generalizability of the results. Replication of the study in other locations could help further 
validate the model while highlighting the possible effects of culture and other socio-
economic differences. Our study could serve as a useful benchmark for comparative 
behavioural analyses. Thirdly, although the arrows in the structural model suggest causality 
our empirical investigations are ultimately based on covariances and correlations between 
variables. In particular, our analyses do not allow us to assert that a strong corporate 
environmental performance is necessarily caused by strong environmental attitudes nor that 
external management loci are caused by environmental reactivism. In our defence, the 
sequences of relationships in our model – values, attitudes, intentions, behaviour 
(performance) – are well established and theoretically sound (Ajzen et al, 2009).  Yet from a 
policy perspective, establishing causality is important particularly with respect to the context 
variables which we argue can be manipulated to offset (to some extent) the impact of 
environmental reactivism. As our understanding of the human element of corporate 
environmental behaviour develops, randomised trials and natural experiments will need to be 












                                                 
1 Note that previous research has identified both external and internal barriers (e.g. Post & 
Altman, 1994) although empirical studies suggest the latter are more powerful (Ruiz-Tagle, 
2003). We empirically tested the relevance of external barriers in our model but found they 
were not statistically significant. They were removed from the final version on grounds of 
parsimony.  
2 All firms were first stratified under the SIC Revision 3 classification and subsequently by 
plant size as measured by number of employees. Within these strata, firms were ranked by 
their level of environmental impact as measured by the NCA or ‘Level of Environmental 
Complexity’ which ranges between 20 and 80. This index is computed by a formula that 
uses a number of environmental impact parameters such as volume of effluents, 
concentration of polluting substances, type of environmental impact as well as features of the 
area surrounding the plant. The Environmental Agency uses NCA to classify firms according 
to whether they are Type I (low impact), Type II (medium impact), Type III (high impact), 
or no impact in accordance with Law 11.459. See Vazquez Brust (2007) for details of the 
sampling method.  
3 For each construct, the three items with the highest factor loadings are used to anchor three 
parcels. The three items with the next highest item-to-construct loadings were added to the 
anchors in an inverted order. The highest loaded item from the anchor items are then 
matched with the lowest loaded item from the second selection…so on and so forth (see 
Little et al (2002) p.166 for more details). 
4  Multicollinearity was also assessed by calculating the squared multiple correlations 
between each variable and all the rest with values greater than 0.90 being of concern (Kline, 
1998). This value was not reached by any of the retained items. We also assessed collinearity 
by computing the tolerance and variance inflationary factor (VIF) for each of the variables. 
If a set of explanatory variables is uncorrelated then its VIF will be equal or close to 1. In 
common practice, a tolerance of less than 0.20 and/or a VIF of 5 and above indicates a 
multicollinearity problem. With VIF values ranging from 1.138 to 1.640, multicollinearity 
was not felt to be an issue. Issues related to kurtosis and skewness of the sample data were 
not felt to be problematic with values ranging from 0.005 to 1.149 for the former and 0.046 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 







Fig. 3: Standardised Path Estimates          
                    
Note: Only statistical significant path estimates are shown (p<.05); CMIN/DF=1.936; CFI=.962; PRATIO=.723; 
RMSEA=.043 2=356.25; df=184; p<.05. The analyses includes all firms. 
 
Table I.  ENVIRONMENTAL REACTIVISM (H1a, H1b) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 







A firm’s responsibilities to its customers, shareholders and employees should be 
prioritised over its responsibilities towards the environment. V222a 
2.37 1.20 .670 
A firm’s responsibility is to comply with regulations set by the State. V222b 3.16 1.22 .548 
A firm’s environmental efforts should commensurate with its economic 
performance. V222c 
2.87 1.15 .599 
The ethical responsibility of the firm is to be profitable. V222h 2.84 125 .509 
It is the role of the government – not the firm’s – to protect the 
environment.V225a  
2.62 1.34 .460 
N=5 items; Cronbach Alpha = 0.72 (without factor weights); KMO=.76; BST=367.719 DF=10 p<.05 






Table II. MANAGERIAL LOCUS OF CONTROL (H2a, H2b) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 







I have insufficient knowledge to influence env.  practices at my firm.  V223a 2.71 1.28 .452 
My firm has insufficient resources to improve the environment. V223d 2.78 1.39 .673 
My firm cannot improve the environment and remain competitive. V223e 2.49 1.37 .845 
It is difficult for my firm to remain successful and improve the env. V223f 2.20 1.31 .675 
N=4 items; Cronbach Alpha = 0.75; KMO=.74; BST=510.875 DF=6 p<.05 
Construct influenced by Aragon-Correa (1998) and Hillary (2000) 
 
Table III. ENV. PERFORMANCE ATTITUDE (PERFATTITUDE –H3a, H3b, H3c) 
Abstracting from the level of success experienced by your firm in the 
implementation of the following environmental actions, how important 
do you think adherence to these environmental actions are in general? 








Adherence to env mgt. system voluntary standards (e.g. ISO1401) v152c 3.42 1.37 .598 Parcel 2 
Internal environmental assessment requirements.  V152d  3.49 1.36 .634 Parcel 1 
Adherence to EMS voluntary standards (e.g. ISO1401). V152e 3.84 1.21 .749 Parcel 3 
Recycling products/by-products/waste. V152f 3.76 1.35 .743 Parcel 1 
Remanufacturing. V152g 3.34 1.46 .655 Parcel 3 
Investment in R&D of env. friendly products/production. V152l 3.36 1.37 .645 Parcel 3 
Rational use of scarce and/or non-renewable raw materials.  V152m 3.99 1.22 .763 Parcel 2 
Imposing env. standards/audits on suppliers/distributors/buyers. V152o  3.58 1.28 .743 Parcel 1 
Developing cleaner manufacturing processes V152p 3.98 1.24 .722 Parcel 2 
N=9 items; Cronbach Alpha = 0.89; KMO=.89;  BST=2067.80 ; DF=36 ; p<.05 
Construct influenced by Bamber & Moser (2007) and Hines et al (1987). 
 
Table IV.   ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INTENTIONS  (EMI – H4) 
Var. Indicators Variable values Mean (s.d.) 
PE Green label 0=no green labels, 1=green labels .18 (.38) 
PA Env. plan 0=no env. plan, 1=env. Plan .47(.49) 
EIA Env. impact assessment 0=no; 0.5=in process;1=approved .28(.42) 
ISO Env. management system 0=no EMS, 1=Ems .17 (.38) 
CAP Env. training 0=no training, 1=training .31 (.46) 
AUD Env. audits variable range where 0=no assessment, 
1=monthly assessments 
.30 (.14) 
SIN Env. synergies in (processes,inputs, & 
outputs) 
Variable range where 0=no synergies, 
1=synergies 
.13(.21) 
DIV Env.disclosure 0=no, 0.25 =if <once a year 
0.5 =if once a year;  
0.75 =if twice a year; 1=if>once a mth. 
.05 (.21) 
NGO Collaboration with env. NGOs 0=no; 1=yes .05 (.20) 
INV Investment in env. R&D 0=no; 1=yes .11 (.25) 
POL Env. policy 0=no; 1=yes .44(.49) 





Table V. INTERNAL OBSTACLES (INTOBS – H5a, H5b, H5c)  
How important do you think the following factors are in preventing 
improvements in the environmental performance of your firm? [1=not 








A lack of knowledge about relevant technologies.  V142a 2.89 1.31 .793 Parcel 2 
A lack of information on how to implement clean production. V142b 2.88 1.35 .827 Parcel 1 
A lack of training at management level. V142c 3.14 1.32 .795 Parcel 3 
A lack of training at operational level. V142d 3.04 1.27 .739 Parcel 3 
A lack of emphasis on env. mgt. by the leaders of the firm. V142e 2.65 1.41 .743 Parcel 1 
A lack of time. V142f 2.92 1.33 .590 Parcel 1 
A lack of economic resources. V142g 3.56 1.35 .606 Parcel 3 
A lack of awareness about the env. consequences of processes V142h 2.75 1.39 .804 Parcel 2 
A lack of available measures (e.g. effluents, water, pollutants). V142i 2.73 1.36 .771 Parcel 3 
An inability to identify and remediate non-compliance. V142j 2.58 1.35 .788 Parcel 1 
The high costs of clean production systems. V142k 3.26 1.34 .647 Parcel 1 
The short term standards imposed by regulation. V142l 2.90 1.31 .624 Parcel 2 
The costs of maintenance of end-of-pipe technologies. V142m 2.79 1.39 .689 Parcel 2 
N=13 items;  Cronbach Alpha= 0.94;  KMO=.934; BST=3741.853;  DF=78;  p<.05 
Construct influenced by Dasgupta et al (2000).  
 
  
Table VI.  PRESSURES (PRESS – H6a, H6b, H6c) 
How important might the following factors be in persuading your 
firm to improve its environmental performance? [1=not important 











Non-compliance fines. V214a 3.93 1.24 .486 Parcel 1 Parcel 1 
Judicial closures. V214c 3.92 1.31 .588 Parcel 1 Parcel 1 
Penal liabilities for managers. V214d 3.86 1.31 .581 Parcel 3 Parcel 3 
Environmental requirements by national buyers/suppliers. V214f 3.32 1.43 .559 Parcel 3 Parcel 3 
Environmental requirements by foreign buyers/suppliers. V214 g 3.16 1.50 .616 Parcel 2 Parcel 2 
Customer preferences for ‘greener’ products. V214h 3.48 1.37 .745 Parcel 1 Parcel 1 
Access to new markets. V214i 3.77 1.32 .728 Parcel 1 Parcel 1 
A green internal corporate policy. V214j 3.62 1.27 .523 Parcel 2 Parcel 2 
Product differentiation. V214n 3.96 1.24 .684 Parcel 3 Parcel 3 
Gaining a competitive advantage over rival firms. V214p 3.82 1.26 .730 Parcel 2 Parcel 2 
The possibility of lagging behind other firms. V214q 3.62 1.32 .742 Parcel 2 Parcel 2 
The risk of acquiring a ‘bad’ public image. V214r 3.84 1.29 .692 Parcel 3 Parcel 3 
N=12 items ; Cronbach Alpha=0.88; KMO=.843; BST=3219.225;  DF=66;  p<.05 
Construct influenced by Sharma & Henriques (2005), Angell & Rands (2003), Dasgupta et al (2000), Henriques 

















Table VII.  ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (Dependent Variable) 
How do you assess the level of success experienced by 
your firm in the implementation of the following 
environmental actions? 











Full compliance with existing environmental regs. V151a 3.68 1.30 .520 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 
Internal environmental assessment requirements. V151c 2.50 1.45 .649 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 
Up-to-date treatment technologies. V151d 2.88 1.43 .647 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 
Recycling of products/sub-products/waste. V151e 3.06 1.57 .668 Parcel 3 Parcel 2 
Constant improvements of processes. V151f 3.50 1.27 .690 Parcel 1 Parcel 2 
Effluents/waste minimization. V151i 3.61 1.33 .716 Parcel 2 Parcel 1 
Constant improvements of processes V151h 3.50 1.27 .668 Parcel 2 Parcel 1 
Reduction in water and energy consumption. V151j 3.81 1.24 .596 Parcel 3 Parcel 1 
Rational use of scarce and/or non-renewable raw 
materials. V151m 
3.09 1.52 .601 Parcel 2 Parcel 1 
Reduction of hazardous emissions. V151n 3.39 1.62 .705 Parcel 3 Parcel 1 
Development of cleaner manufacturing processes  V151p 3.26 1.40 .556 Parcel 3 Parcel 1 
N=11 items; Cronbach Alpha=0.87;  KMO=.883; BST=1764.115 ; DF=55;  p<.05 
Construct adapted from Chudnovsky (1997). 
 
Table VIII. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability Coefficients  
Construct/Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1. Environmental Reactivism  13.87 4.10 0.72        
2. Managerial Locus of Control  10.60 3.69 .31** 0.75       
3. Environmental Attitude  32.69 8.68 -.14** -.15** 0.89      
4. Environmental Intentions  2.93 2.28 -.20** -.38** .40** N.A.     
5. Internal Obstacles  38.05 13.00 .12** .26** .10** -.18** 0.94    
6. Stakeholder Pressures  44.44 10.53 -.02 -.01 .38** .20** .15** 0.88   
7. Environmental Performance  34.13 10.24 -.15** -.34** .51** .69** -.22** .22** 0.87  
8. SIZE 97.07 319.99 -.15** -.23 .11** .26** -.09 .02 .17** N.A. 






















































df=1323;   
p<.005 
2=386.626  
df=174;   
p<.005 
2=324.222.  














CMIN/DFb 2.014 2.222 2.092 2.111 1.936 1.741 1.770 


































































a. Ideally, we want p>.05 but this is rarely possible in large samples. (Byrne, 2001) 
b. Values below 3 are indicative of a good model (Kline, 1998). 
c. Comparative fit index. Values >.90 (>.95) are indicative of good and very good fit respectively (Byrne, 2001). 
d. Root mean square error of approximation. Values <.05 represent very good fit while values <.08 are acceptable. (Byrne, 
2001) 
e. These indicators ‘penalise’ the model for having too many parameters. Values above .50 are associated with good fit 
(Mulaik, Van Altine, Bennett, Lind and Stilwell, 1989). 
f. States the sample size at which the 2 would not be significant. Hoelter (1983) proposed that a value in excess of 200 is 
indicative of a model that adequately represents the sample data. 
**with internally consistent facets (parcels) for PRESSURES, ENVPERF;  





Table X: Maximum Likelihood Regression Weights – Model Relationships 






















(H1b)  Environmental Attitude <--- Environmental Reactivism 
-.00 






















(H3a)  Env. Mgt. Intentions 








(H3b)  Env. Performance  
































(H5c)  Env. Performance 

































Managerial Locus of Control <--- Size 
-.16** 
(.00) 





N. A. N. A. N. A. 




N.A. N.A. N.A. 




N. A. N. A. N. A. 
** p<.01; *p<.05 
 
 
 
 
